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Abstrak
Paper ini membahas tentang kelompok kelas menengah Tionghoa 
Indonesia di Kota Solo Propinsi Jawa Tengah. Berbasis penelitian 
etnografis, tulisan ini menggali bagaimana kelas menengah 
Tionghoa Indonesia meredefinisi peran dan identitas mereka. 
Dengan mengambil tiga aspek sosial, yaitu ekonomi, pendidikan, 
dan agama, tulisan ini mencoba melihat dinamika sosial masyarakat 
etnis Tionghoa pada rezim Suharto dan sesudah reformasi. 
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Backgrounds
This paper attempts to portray middle class Chinese Indonesians2 
and how this class initiates and builds the new networks and social 
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Chinese Indonesians’ current network building as dual response to the 
former violence experience they suffered in the 1998 riots and to the need 
for strengthening their social and cultural capital in post-riot period. 
Compared to poor and rich Chinese Indonesians, middle class Chinese 
Indonesians were apparently the most vulnerable and most of them have 
become the real victims during the riots. 
Their post-riot efforts to be well-organized, thus, need to be seen 
partly as resulting from immense violent experience as well as ways to 
compensate their actual lack of financial resources and social ties with 
non-Chinese sections of population in the city. And this as made more 
possible with in the marked change in political structure in Post-Suharto 
period where issue of civil and political rights proliferates and shapes 
the ways the government and non-Chinese groups treat Chinese minority 
nation-wide.
Who actually middle class Chinese Indonesian is? Taking into 
account the discussion about middle class, middle class can be categorized 
as a group whose economic capital might not be as high as upper class 
and not as evidently low as lower class, but this group actually enjoys 
higher cultural capital. Middle class also has possibility to do vertical or 
upward mobility. Middle class group sees cultural properties as valuable 
properties that have immense effect on practices (Bourdieu, 1984, Swartz, 
1997), for instance education. Middle class usually gives more attention to 
education (Devine, 2004 in Turner, 2006), instead of other type of properties. 
Based on this consideration, thus, profession-based categorization, such 
as academician or university teacher and social activist, represents the 
practice of middle class families (Swartz, 1997).
 In correspondence with the characters of middle class, particularly 
middle class Chinese Indonesians, this paper goes into preference to 
choose informants based entirely on the professional categorization 
aforesaid. In contemporary context of Indonesian politics, the increasing 
participation of middle class Chinese in social and political matters has 
been so far influenced by the actively growing involvement of Indonesian 
middle class into public matters. Since the beginning of reformasi period 
(199), Indonesian middle class has taken leading role in transforming 
political landscape and empowering the capacity of civil society alike. 
The collapse of Suharto’ regime tells us much about the political 
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power of this class of people as pressure group. It is also the fact that 
the sustainability of the reformasi has until now been facilitated by the 
political activity of the civil society that not only be guardian but also active 
proponent of the present government and parliaments at both national 
and local level. In such general context, political awareness and sensibility 
seems to arise among middle class Chinese Indonesians. After reformasi, 
Chinese Indonesians start to struggle for reclaiming their lost political 
and civil rights, as fundamental rights as Indonesian citizens. During this 
period, they actively involve in daily politics and in electoral democracy 
practices, as well as strengthen various forms of social activities that mark 
their rise into open negotiation with other identity groups.
In his discussion on Indonesian middle class, Niels Mulder (2000) 
notes the democratic direction Indonesia has taken so far, has much to do 
with the role and influence of the well educated and open minded people 
who mostly belong to this class. Middle class become the spokesperson 
for democracy and human rights, and endorse the government to crafting 
policies supportive to the fulfillment of people’s basic needs. The current 
war on corruption as part of public appeal for government accountability 
and transparency are led by this class of various professions. However, 
such progress also gives caution that, as many evidences suggest, the 
loosely control of political role performed by this class has facilitated 
both the survival and revival of technocratic-ism and bureaucratic-ism 
in politics and potential of sectarianism and religious fundamentalism in 
public sphere. This dark side in the rise of civil society has it’s propensity 
to weaken civil society movement and worse, mislead many segments of 
population into collective violence against each other (Mulder, 2000: 14, 
110).
However, this paper will argue that Chinese Indonesia’s 
involvement in civil society movements is partly prompted by post-
conflict or post-violence situation. Violent conflict this minority group has 
experienced turns to have been a turning point from which they begin 
their struggle for freedom and recognition of their identity. In that struggle 
they actively negotiate with other identity groups in localities. The public 
appeal for political equality and multiculturalism, have compelled them 
to reflect on their experience of violence and abandonment as cause for the 
reclamation. Some of their core demands are fulfilled as can be seen during 
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Abdurrahman Wahid presidency (1999-2001), where the government and 
national bill assert their rights for conducting religious practice. Since 
that time, many restrictive policies on Chinese Indonesians have been 
amended and removed as civil society movement persistently keep their 
eye on the accountability of the government to enacting political and civil 
rights.
The changing in political setting as well as the amendment of 
policies addressing Chinese minority in Indonesia, on one hand has 
opened the pathways for Chinese to get more freedom and to actualize 
themselves as part of Indonesian nation-state. It is proven by the rise 
number of Chinese Indonesians who actively taking part into local and 
national politics. The Indonesian decentralization policies which has been 
asserted since 2001, has opened the opportunity for the emerging new 
middle class Indonesia, particularly in local or provincial level. The middle 
class such as teachers, academician, and middle level entrepreneur are 
mostly taking part in the local political arena. Especially among Chinese 
Indonesians community, this tendency has also been found. As examples, 
some Chinese Indonesians are now playing their role in local politics. 
Some of them are positing their selves as political party member, senator 
or even come forward as head of regency or governor. Besides, the violence 
they have ever experienced, has grown the awareness among them to get 
in touch with the social networks surrounded them. As marked, middle 
class Chinese Indonesians, as bigger in number than the poor and rich 
Chinese, have it’s heterogeneous characters, which has also resulted in 
the differentiation of their responses to the post-conflict situation. It seems 
that they have been compelled to take many possible ways to cope with 
their security problem and negotiate with difference that marks societal 
and cultural life of Indonesian Society.
In anti-Chinese turmoil nation-wide, the case of Solo has confirmed 
that middle class Chinese has fallen into the category of the most violated 
group. Most of them were victims with no significant economic and 
cultural capital to enabling them negotiate with the violators and the 
insecure circumstances. Their social networks, which mostly limited to 
professional associations, did not work effectively mainly because during 
the riot what counts are financial resources as to buy protection and social 
relationship with the non-Chinese inhabitants/villagers as to be treated 
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similar or not slightly different from the rioters and the non-Chinese 
villagers. 
In that situation, they actually had no prominent protecting 
mechanism and what they did is, among other, looking for haven in 
villages where their Chinese families, mostly poor, reside in peaceful 
coexistence with the non-Chinese inhabitants. Their goods and other 
valuable assets were rescued into the villages and protected by both the 
families and the villagers. But not all of them took that way since they could 
not claim to have familial relation with the Chinese villagers. This section 
of middle class sought haven in churches where they were protected by 
non-Chinese Christians. Christians in Solo comprise many non-Chinese 
from various ethnic backgrounds—the majority is Javanese Christians. 
This, of course, does not actually explain the strength of religious bond 
or strong solidarity among Christians. In fact, the protection defines a 
quick response by non-Chinese Christians as the Chinese came in rush to 
the church area and then provoked a sense of empathy among the non-
Chinese Christian to protect them including valuable assets they brought 
with. Only few middle class sought safer place in neighbour cities like 
Yogyakarta, Magelang and Semarang.
Looking more specifically into middle class Chinese community, 
the most disadvantaged among middle class Chinese were those who ran 
medium business scale. They suffered a lot of lost in terms of trade and 
residence. Their shops and their business building were burnt down to 
the ground and their commodities and assets were looted by the rioters. 
It also happened to their houses which were located next to or directly 
mixed with their business building and shops. It is obvious that for the 
rioters such buildings symbolized prosperity and economic injustice alike 
regardless the fact that these sort of business is mostly medium scale and 
relatively similar with other non-Chinese shops in the city. While for the 
victims such lost means that they have to start their business at zero point. 
Shop building must be rebuilt, assets be bought, and a certain amount of 
money required to financing their new business activities.
Whilst in the riot, other Chinese groups (elites and working class) 
could optimized their own capital in—elites Chinese who maximised 
the use of economic capital and working class Chinese who employed 
their symbolic status as ‘not proper Chinese’ due to their low level of 
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wealth—middle class found difficulties in maximizing their social capitals 
and enlarging or deepening social bonds to protect them, due to the 
limitation or concrete lack of social capital. As discussed before, most of 
their associational activities revolved around their professional network. 
Few of them who are teachers, lecturers and public servants involved in 
specific professional network which somehow so limited in enlarging and 
deepening their social ties with other groups outside those professions. 
On the other hand, most of the middle class are traders and merchants 
who spent most of their time running their economic activities. 
During the riots, the former, non-businessmen Chinese, were safe 
and their houses were not burnt down since they have lived life pattern 
similar to the non-Chinese inhabitants and been perceived of as ‘part 
of us’ by their neighbors and the rioters as well. However, this implies 
neither absence of feeling as minority nor lack of effort to strengthening 
their social by engaging themselves with broader spectrum of identity 
building in post riot period. Despite difference in degree and forms of 
coping with the past violence experience (the 199 riot), those ethnically 
public servants Chinese and businessmen both have suffered traumatic 
experiences and been seeking to renegotiate their demographic and 
cultural status as minority with other identity groups by enmeshing 
themselves in networks with loose or tight associational ties, be they 
economic, educational and religious in nature.
Interestingly that for the Chinese Indonesians, experience of 
collective violence has resulted not only in how they redefine their 
national identity, but also in how they redefine their specific identity as 
Chinese, namely—as part of Indonesian Chinese and as part of overseas 
Chinese. Equally important is the fact that they see network building as 
something of great importance in the overall process of identity negotiation 
and reinvention. In practice, networks are various, starting from the 
traditional networks concerning economic relations (guanxi) to the more 
contemporary phenomenon like Charismatic Christian Church networks, 
which currently prevalent among Chinese Indonesians in Solo. 
Whatever the form of network they take, it is obvious that the 
networks have begun to function as channeling their demands for security, 
recognition and self-development in the web of multicultural identities of 
Indonesian society. Those networks are not final product of their struggle, 
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but a function through which they continuously identify themselves, and 
in many cases those networks are overlapping in their function, combining 
many possible strategies and interests, be they economic and political, 
economic and cultural and so forth.
In the following treatment, I will discuss social aspects of middle 
class Chinese families as part of means that have influenced their attempts 
at reconstructing their identity in the post violence experiences in Solo. 
Based on several tendencies found in the field, the most taken channels the 
middle class Chinese are actively employing and so far proved effective 
in redefinition of their self-group identity are (i) Guanxi networks as 
family and economic network, (ii) Education as the pathways to building 
international connection and facilitating the invention of a sense of global 
citizen, and (iii) Religion in their search for sense of security and social 
identity, which is partly inclusive (engaging with non-Chinese Christians 
in Islam and Christianity) and partly exclusive (revivalism in Tao and 
Confucianism where the followers are mostly Chinese). 
i. Guanxi, Economic and Familial Networks among Middle Class 
Chinese Indonesians in Solo
In highlighting the significance of this network, I start through the 
profile of Anto Tan3, who is one of my informants in Solo. I spent many 
times participating in his (and his fellow) activities. Through his networks 
I try to map connections, changes, and mobility of middle class Chinese 
Indonesians in Solo. 
Anto Tan is the owner of small-scale jarak (castor) oil company. 
He told me enthusiastically that jarak oil business in the future will 
help the environment since it function to replace crude oil.  Once, Anto 
invited me to join in the meeting with his colleague. He introduced me 
to Samekto, a Chinese peranakan, who was Anto’s business partner. They 
planned to buy jarak seeds from farmers in East Java. They also talked 
about possibility whether Prasojo, one of the share owners of a biggest 
medicine and confectionery company in Solo, could contribute or take 
part in their Jarak seeds oil business. Prasojo is a conglomerate in Solo. 
3	 The	names	of	people	in	this	paper	is	anonymous,	however	the	names	of	places,	cities,	and	pub-
lic	figures	remain	unchanged.
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Anto, Samekto, and Prasojo have known each other since long time ago
Chinese descends in Solo are basically acquainted to each other. 
Networks in business and trading are effective channel to communicate 
between Chinese groups in Solo. Since early reformasi period, Chinese 
associations have increased in number and intensity and this makes 
the emerging social network among Chinese Indonesian in Solo is 
possible. Moreover, social networks through business and trading, 
as well as associations have helped to build the connection at national 
and international level. Chinese Indonesians have admitted their strong 
feeling as Chinese overseas and their rising attachment to other Chinese 
overseas in around the world. This emotional attachment feeling is often 
strengthened through their involvement in the well organized links of 
Chinese social networks.
Network is so important for Chinese people overseas to maintaining 
and expanding their ties. It draws upon two approaches, firstly, through 
the creation of familial ties, and secondly, through economic connection 
between Chinese or so-called Guanxi. In Solo, these connective strategies 
appear through the emergence of associations that combine interest, 
kinship or the originality and Guanxi network. Most of all, they are 
characterized by familial bond and friendship.
As I examine from the fieldwork, Chinese associations in Solo are 
apt to utilize network and acting as a bridge between Chinese and non 
Chinese in Solo throughout their various activities, especially through 
benevolent acts as part of coping from the problem of minority by building 
good image. Chinese association is the arena to maintain kinship and 
friendship among Chinese in Solo which is valuable for trading network. 
As Ong (1999) asserts these types of paternal bond and interpersonal 
relations have given birth to the so called imagined community of Chinese 
overseas.
Prominence of kinship or originality criteria can be seen in the 
fact that the establishment and maintenance of the associations originate 
in how their members identify themselves as part of sub-ethnic group or 
coming from certain area or province in China, for example, association 
for Hokkian Chinese or Hakka Chinese, to mention the example is Yayasan 
Fu Qing as the organization for descendant from Fujian province.
In post-Suharto’s Indonesia, where activities of Chinese Indonesians 
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associations were no longer banned, the number of familial association is 
improving. In post Suharto, Chinese associations have characterization to 
strongly encouraged Chinese cultural revitalization. Moreover, Chinese 
Indonesians have also started to organized themselves into their original 
province or sub-ethnic in China.  
 But on the other hand, they also tend to manage their 
familial connection into economic connection or so-called guanxi. For 
middle class Chinese Indonesians such as Anto, guanxi and familial-based 
associations have facilitated their efforts to reasserting their identity as 
overseas Chinese, making them more attached to one single identity: as 
part of global Chinese diaspora. It creates a sense of group identity they 
are longing for, a sense of strong community that might contribute to their 
capacity in dealing with violent circumstances in future. They also make 
clear that this guanxi network, however fragile is it, has offered them 
access to vertical mobility in economic terms. It is through this network 
that they are gradually exposed to greater opportunity to increase their 
economic capital which in time of crisis will of great assistance for them 
to enjoy physical security protection from hired police or non-Chinese 
inhabitants.
ii. Education and Emerging New Social Classes among Chinese 
Indonesian  Family Post Reformasi
Education is a predominant achievement and means of social 
mobility among Chinese Indonesian. Through education, middle class 
Chinese families in Solo have enjoyed new vertical mobility. Education for 
middle class Chinese is somehow accessible and yet favorable one since it 
helps to shape their image as educated, well informed, and this is jumping 
stone to higher economic rank. In both Suharto and post Suharto period, 
middle class Chinese families in Solo have been categorized as the one 
enjoying greater chance and resources in terms of vertical mobilization 
through education.
Quantitatively speaking, the number of the member of middle 
class Chinese who have been educated or currently pursuing their higher 
education is fairly high in Solo. As many people mentioned in the field, 
Chinese Indonesian students in Solo have for years shown their good 
performance at school. However, such achievement incites dislike and 
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jealousy among non-Chinese groups in the city. Similar treatment comes 
from the school officials who, particularly in New Order period, seek to 
restrict their access to educational institution in the city. Personal experience 
from Martha, a doctor based in Pasar Gede, Solo, probably can describe 
how outstanding achievements of Chinese students at school allow more 
possibilities of being discriminated by majority groups, especially at the 
time of Suharto’s New Order (Nurul Aini, 2003):
I graduated from junior high school with the very good grade. 
At that time, I applied to the best public high school in Solo. 
My parents and I considered that going to public school was 
better and cheaper, especially because my parents ware not 
rich enough to send me to the Catholic school, for instance. 
But what we got, the head of the school told us, that there 
was a quota for Chinese students; it was about maximum  
percent from total new students. The head of school said that 
it was a policy from the centre, from Jakarta (pusat). When 
my parents checked it out, there was no policy as such. 
And the head finally said, ’if we accept all the application 
from Chinese students then this school will be the school of 
Chinese students’.
The restriction of Chinese students to enter Indonesian public 
school was never explicitly mentioned in any national education policies, 
but the discrimination has been taking place for many years. It is in 
common perception that Chinese should not be enrolled in Indonesian 
public school or public university, otherwise they will dominate 
Indonesian public school. This condition has produced no resistance but 
efforts from the society to establish more and more private educational 
institutions where most of the Chinese students have entered and 
graduated. In Indonesia, Catholic schools are the most apparent. In 
the case of Martha, her parents finally decided to send her to Catholic 
school, even though it was a bit expensive, but fortunately the quality 
of the school is also good. Entering Catholic school furthermore has 
then become the rational choice for Chinese parents, particularly from 
middle class family. 
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Umar, a Chinese Indonesian working as Javanese language 
lecturer in a public university in Solo sent his son to a Catholic school in 
Yogyakarta, said that he even never think to send his son to public school, 
although he himself working as a public servant. As a public servant, he 
realized that it will be difficult for his son to compete to the public school 
enrolment, due to his Chinese-ness. As a lecturer in public university, he 
rarely has Chinese students. 
Candrawan, another informant, a middle business owner, also 
preferred private school rather than public school. After graduated from 
high school, he admitted his son to go further study in Singapore. Now, his 
son is working in a company in Singapore and he is a permanent resident 
of Singapore. Candrawan acknowledged that Singapore promises a better 
life. 
As public servant, Umar said that his son’s achievement in 
education is a sort of vertical mobility in their family. On contrary, for 
many businessmen family, their children’s achievement in education also 
means the end of their business’ successors. For instance, Candrawan 
said that probably his business will be the last business, since none of his 
children seems want to continue his business.
Anto also shares that experience. He said that none of his children 
want to work on jarak oil business because the education has made them 
prefer to work on private company rather than continue his business or 
build up their own business. In the case of Umar, Candrawan, and Anto, I 
found that all of their children gave up with their parents business. All of 
their children have no willingness to inherit their parents business, as the 
result of getting education, both local and international education among 
middle class Chinese Indonesia.
The above description and examples confirm the argument raised 
by certain scholars that a middle class based on educational qualification 
and expertise confronts the old networks of patronage and loyalty 
(Robinson and Goodman, 1996:). The next generation of middle class 
Chinese tends to break the network of their parents and build their own 
networks. The result of international education, moreover, has created the 
new link for young educated Chinese Indonesians. The affinity to global 
world and global citizen currently grows in parallel with their broader 
experience and stateless kind of occupations.
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Considering the ways education empowers middle class Chinese 
to coping with violent circumstances, it is clear that it has exposed them to 
different world of experience and profession. They feel more secure when 
they are mobile in the sense that they do not completely reside in Solo and 
take profession different from their parents, which proved less capable of 
vertical mobility and guaranteeing their security during the riots in 199.
iii. Finding the Social Networks through Religions; From 
Economic Guanxi to Religion Guanxi
In this section, I am going to relate religions among middle class 
Chinese Indonesians as part of Chinese Indonesian’s identity building. 
The network among Chinese Indonesia is traditionally built through the 
clan similarity or line where same origin of ancestors and family names are 
used to draw the linkage. The business network is also one way to build the 
network, especially among bourgeoisie Chinese. Now as explored in this 
section, religion turns to have been another away of connecting Chinese 
groups like Taoism and Confucianism, or with non- Chinese groups like 
Islam and Christianity, particularly Charismatic Church movement. It 
is after 199 that religion currently grows as channeling their identity 
building as to cope with difference and with problems inherent in their 
insecure mind as minority and insecure environment that treats them as 
defenceless groups.
Chinese Indonesians sees religion in many ways. During the 
period of Suharto, Chinese’s religion was banned considering to the 
restriction to Chinese culture. The practice of Chinese beliefs and 
religions, such as Taoism and Confucianism, has officially banned though 
in the national constitution it is implicitly recognized as they confine to 
‘the believers of the Almighty’, beside Islam, Catholic, Protestantism, 
Buddhism and Hinduism. Before Reformasi period, no laws ever issued 
as to clarify whether Taoism and Confucianism felt into that category. In 
the early year of New Order, the government issued Instruksi Presiden 
(Presidential Instruction) No 49/V/IN/196 on the Board of Coordination 
Chinese Affairs in Indonesia. The board, known as Badan Koordinasi 
Masalah Cina, took control over issues and problems concerning Chinese 
Indonesians, more as means of surveillance and restriction. As the effect 
of the working of this board, temples of Taoism and Confucianism, for 
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example, were merged with the Buddhist temples.
The issuing of the policy indicates how the government took 
Chinese Indonesians seriously. The establishment of the board and it’s 
subsequent policies has influenced the development of many aspects 
of Chinese cultures. Many core rituals—part of religious practices and 
Chinese customs—disappeared from Chinese communities. Chinese 
schools were no longer operated; the Chinese New Year Eve was no 
longer celebrated; and Chinese temples were not allowed to have Chinese 
symbols and emblems.
At this phase, many of Chinese Indonesian felt more comfortable 
to convert into other religions and cultural practices. The explicit 
acknowledgement in the constitution of the five official religions in 
has forced them to choose one of the official religions. Many of them 
voluntarily convert to Buddhism—with the reason that this religion is 
closer to their traditional religions, but big part of the Chinese population 
has converted to Christianity. Those who did not explicitly convert to any 
official religions usually put Islam in their National Identity Card (Kartu 
Tanda Penduduk/KTP).
While the believers of Chinese religion were putting Islam on their 
KTP in order to get influential benefit in their relation with the majority 
of Muslim Indonesian, the case of Suparman, is perhaps the peculiar one 
since religion is smartly-played as the way to gain more in economic field, 
as to maintaining and enlarging economic, cultural, and social capital.
I know Suparman from Anto. Anto once told me that he and 
Suparman are friends since they were young and spent times in illicit 
activities. When they become older as they are now, they come back to 
the God’s way. At present, Anto is member of of a Charismatic church 
while Suparman is active in Mujahidin Islam. In their youth, Suparman 
and Anto were partners in gambling industry in Solo in the early 190s. 
Suparman was a influential preman at that time, while Anto managed 
printing business for gambling paper.
I met Suparman that morning in his office. He is a man with 
talkative and straight forwarded personality. He boasted to me that in the 
beginning of 190s he was a richest man in Solo, because of his gambling 
business. Not just gambling, Suparman also told me that he was a beking 
(backing, support, or henchmen) of the conglomerates in Solo. He was 
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paid by them to protect their business and paid to make other businesses 
rivals collapse, sometimes in violent ways.
As he told me, he was like a snake. He was as slickly as those 
who worked in an underground or mafia world. As preman, he reached 
a vertical mobility, from a very poor young Chinese boy living in gang 
(small alley) into the big head gangster. He expressed to me about his 
past,
It was in the range of early 190s until early 190s I worked 
as gambling owners. I know that at that time many rivals 
and enemies tried to kill me, they send paid murderers to 
hurt me. But I was too strong. Everybody was so afraid of 
me. I made friend with big businessman, politicians, and 
police. I bribed them. I had all properties, very big houses, 
cars, everything. Yet, I know that slander and character 
assassination are really close in the dark business like this. 
In November 193, the turmoil happened in Solo. The issue 
started from the fighting between a young Javanese and 
Chinese, Pipit and Kecak. Nobody knew what the exact 
cause of the fighting. But soon it turned to be an anti-Chinese 
riot or we called it with Geger Pecinan. Houses and business 
of Chinese were burnt and devastated. Solo was isolated for 
2 days. After riots, police came to my house and arrested 
me. They said that I was dalang (literary. puppeteer, in this 
context means the creator) of conflict. I asked them, what 
was my interest in this riot? But polices kept me into prison. 
I was arrested for  months without any fair court with the 
accusation of being a dalang of riot. In the prison I finally 
knew who slandered me. It was really an intrigue between 
preman. I will not tell the name, but I know. In the prison, 
I arranged for committing murder. But later I changed my 
mind. In the prison I learned Islam teaching, and I switch to 
profess Islam, and be a better person.
He continued his story with the story after released from the jail. 
It was not easy to tell or show his religious conversion to his preman 
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fellows. But in the same time he needed his job in premanisme sector. 
But he stopped his acitivity after having heard from somebody that he 
was targeted in the so called Petrus operation (Penembakan Misterius-
Mysterious Shooting operation held by military and police to fighting 
street criminals). He heard that his rivals sought to get him out the business 
by using the rumour of Petrus.
The simple reason why Suparman was being targeted in Petrus 
operation was his activity as preman and he has tattoos. That is the 
reason why he was jailed in 1980. Tattoos in the body became the signifier 
that enabled police and military to quickly distinguish preman from 
nonpreman or ordinary people. As mentioned by Joshua Barker (2001: 
34), although having tattoos does not necessarily mean that a person is 
criminal, tattoos have signified the identity of criminals. As Suparman 
told in interview, many people, not only preman, with tattoos tried to 
remove their tattoos to avoid petrus operation.
The relation of tattoos and criminals, describe by Barker as in the 
chain as follows:
Criminal > prisoner > blacklist > identity file > tattoo noted 
in file > tattoo on body > fingerprint > criminal (Barker, 2001: 
3).
Tattoos were also taken to signify that a person has ever been 
jailed due to some criminal activities. Suparman also experienced such 
signification. Hearing that he was the target of Petrus operation, he 
attempted to show his conversion to Islam publicly. After announcing his 
conversion, he stated his attachment to the only Islamic political party. 
He acknowledged that these movements saved his life. He supported a 
lot of money to that political party. After that he got many sympathies 
from society as enlightened person who transformed from ex-Chinese 
preman to a religious person. Even though he himself confessed that it 
was several years after his conversion that he could really understand 
what Islam is. His involvement in the political party continued. In the 
beginning of 1990s he joined into the New Order political party. Now, he 
is a director of a middle-size tobacco company in Solo, and in recent years 
he surprised those who know him with his membership in Islamic hard-
line mass organization in the city.
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Despite the obvious fact that using Muslim name is part of 
negotiation with powerful group or constraining circumstances, such 
as in the description of the figure of Suparman in his relation to Islam 
and society, big number of Chinese converted Christianity, Catholic or 
Protestantism. The International Herald Tribune4 reported that over 0 
percents of Chinese Indonesian are now Christians. This wants to explain 
that although Confucianism has been over officially recognized in the last 
ten years, many Chinese remain members of the major religions.
However, Confucianism temples, which during New Order 
concealed as Buddhist temples, have started to declare their appearance 
as completely Confucianism temples. And it should be kept in mind 
that the conversion of many Chinese Indonesians into Christianity has 
taken place for long time, even during colonial period. Christianity 
seems more acceptable for Chinese. The thing that I highlighted in the 
religious dynamics in Solo is the growing development of Charismatic 
churches, mostly belonging to Protestantism. The churches of Charismatic 
movement in Indonesia can be identified as the churches which hold their 
religious practices in certain part of shopping mall buildings and mostly 
grow in urban areas. 
Arjun Appadurai (1996) and Vasquest (2003) relate the trend of 
Charismatic cultures as part of globalization and modernization that bring 
more anxieties than hope. The presence of such religious movement is 
perceived by many people as offering new hopes and solidarity in dealing 
with the de-personalization and de-humanization process of modern life 
and institutions.
My relationship with Anto, as mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, has also brought me closer to his daily life or private affairs like 
his religious beliefs and preference. In a meeting with Anto and Saminto, 
they also told me that their relationship becomes more intense and closer 
since they both become members of of Titipan Allah Church (literary 
God entrusted). Titipan Allah is a church based on evangelical Christian 
or Charismatic movement. Titipan Allah church in Solo is led by a 
Chinese descent priest. It has attracted many Chinese to convert to Bethel 
Pentecostal Church. As we already discussed, the conversion of Chinese 
	 ‘In	 Indonesia	 the	 Chinese	 go	 to	 Church,’	 International	 Herald	Tribune,	 Thursday,	 2	April	
2006.
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Indonesians into Christianity seems to appear as response to the official 
restriction of Chinese religion especially during New Order period. It 
is also the fact that following a Chinese priest is also a possible way to 
strengthen the familial and community ties (T.H Sumartana, 2003: 69).
Religion is taking the role as the new bridge for social connections. 
Even though in the decades of Suharto’s regime Chinese Indonesians 
tended to avoid all discussions about religion, now the situation has a little 
bit changed. The effect of religious banned in Suharto’s regime remains in 
place. Many Chinese still find that talking about SARA should be avoided, 
even though there has been greater room and freedom compared to the 
previous period.
Nevertheless, there are also growing number of Chinese who 
have critical awareness of the social injustice or with political issues, 
not explicitly stated in their direct connection to political and social 
movement, or certain ideology, but through the involvement in religious 
activity. This phenomenon is typical in all regions in the country, where 
political movement and political parties are mostly formed on the basis of 
religions rather than ideologies.
After riot 199 and reformasi era has started, strengthening 
social networks through religion becomes the save option for Chinese 
Indonesians to initiate and maintain their social connection. From several 
personal stories mentioned earlier, being involved in the majority religion 
(Islam and Christianity) has opened the opportunity to be part of the 
major society.
Another example was given through the involvement of Chinese to 
the new religion movement (Charismatic Church), where this religion has 
tempted people from both majority and minority groups into conversion. 
Charismatic Church has elicited growing reaction and protests from many 
section of the population in the city. But this does not stop it from attracting 
more and more Chinese by it’s zeal and appeal for ‘being together’ in time 
of peace and crisis. 
Keesing (1987) quotes the notion of religion while Geertz (1966), 
asserts that as a system of symbol religion acts to establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating 
conception of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions 
with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem 
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uniquely realistic. This conceptualization is fairly in line with the 
increasing power of Charismatic Church by which it’s members (those 
converted) are drawn to think of it as source of motivation, encouragement 
and sense of order in their life circumstance, something that they think of 
as insecure and threatening. For them, this religion provides them not 
only with transcendental meaning or divine virtues a religious man has to 
acquired, but most importantly, social and cultural dimension that binds 
victims into a sense of powerful self and community.
Concluding Remarks
Middle class Chinese Indonesians use those three social aspects, 
which are economic network, education, and religion, as their forms 
of identity negotiation as survival and consolidating strategy alike. It 
seems very obvious that many forms of negotiation they have employed 
in post riots period aim to ensure that their sense of security needs to 
be strengthened by practical means and activities. What worth noticing 
is the fact that middle class Chinese Indonesians as a biggest group in 
membership and the most vulnerable group has employed or making use 
economic network, education, and religion as strategy to build their new 
form of identity negotiation.*****
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